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NOTES
NONCONFORMING USES: A RATIONALE
AND AN APPROACH
One of the principal obstacles to a modern city's attainment of an
ideally planned community is a legislative or judicial requirement that uses
of property in existence at the time of the enactment or amendment of a
zoning ordinance, which do not conform to the newly prescribed uses of
the area, may not be forced to discontinue. Popularly labeled, this is the
problem of the existing nonconforming use. This Note will first seek to
define by case law and statute the phrase "existing nonconforming use"
and describe the privileges extended to such uses. Then a rationale for
the protection of existing uses can be submitted and the present law
criticized in the light of the rationale.
THa PROBLEM AND ITS SOURCES
The power of a city to zone is an aspect of the state's police power
and must be conferred by the state through an enabling statute.' A typical
zoning ordinance classifies each portion of the urban area into one of
several zones ranging from "Class A residential" to "least restricted" and
prohibits the establishment of a particular use in an area zoned for uses
of a higher classification. 2  However, it may be possible for some common
uses of property to be excluded altogether.3 The classification of an area
must bear a reasonable relation to the actual composition of the neighbor-
hood at the time of the enactment of the ordinance,4 although the mere
1. See Durkin Lumber Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 106 N.J.L. 183, 187-88, 147 Atl.
555, 557 (1929).
2. The Philadelphia zoning ordinance, for instance, contains the following general
classifications: residential, commercial, industrial, least restricted, and park districts.
The residential and commercial have several subclassifications each. PHILADELPHIA
ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 5-25, ORDINANCES OF THE Crr" OF PHILADELPHIA 276-334
(1933), as amended through 1952. While most ordinances allow a higher use
to locate in an area zoned for a lower classification, it can be argued that such
a practice encourages the development of slums and should be prohibited.
3. See Duffcon Concrete Products, Inc. v. Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d
347 (1949). Here the town was permitted to prohibit completely manufacturing
businesses that used more than one horse power mechanical power, businesses
that sold produce other than at retail, businesses that furnished services for other
than residents, or businesses employing more than five persons. The court took
notice of a nearby area peculiarly adapted to industrial development and sufficiently
large to accommodate such development for years to come.
4. Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166, 180 N.E. 767 (1932) (where highest use
of property is commercial, unreasonable to restrict use to single family dwellings);
Sigretto v. Board of Adjus't of Rutherford, 134 N.J.L. 587, 50 A.2d 492 (Sup. Ct.
1946) (unreasonable to restrict to residences land in an area unsuited to residential
purposes) ; Tews v. Woolhiser, 352 Ill. 212, 185 N.E. 827 (1933) (unreasonable
to zone as residential a triangle surrounded by a commercial district).
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fact that a sparsely settled area is adaptable for industrial use will not
prevent the city from zoning it as residential.5 An individual landowner
may be able to attack the ordinance successfully on the ground that his
property should have been classified with a neighboring area,0 or that the
effect of the zoning law has been to render his property worthless.7 In
spite of these general limitations, however, uses that do not conform to
the applicable zoning classification are bound to exist, especially in older
and more fully developed communities.
The rules of nonconformity typically come into operation when a
building is in use for a specific purpose at the time of the enactment of
the zoning restriction outlawing such use. In Jones v. City of Los An-
geles 8 four mental hospitals were located in an area at the time it was
decreed residential. The court held that although hospitals are proper
subjects of exclusion from residential areas, only extraordinary public
necessity could justify zoning that would require established uses to change
without compensation. 9 Zoning here was distinguished from nuisance law
in that the former is not limited to the control of harmful uses. Because
of this distinction, the court said that zoning must not be allowed to
have retroactive effect or be so drastic as the law of nuisances. 10 This
doctrine has found substantial support in other jurisdictions on the general
theory that "Zoning seeks to stabilize and protect and not to destroy." 1.
Recently the New York Court of Appeals clarified the doctrine by saying
that the property owner is protected when his interest is too substantial
to justify deprivation in the light of the objectives to be achieved by en-
forcement of the zoning provision. Since a regulation which requires
cessation of an already existing use will almost always impose a sub-
stantial loss and hardship, there has developed a doctrine of protection of
nonconforming uses generally. The New York court held that here, how-
ever, since termination of the particular nonconforming use did not render
valueless any substantial improvements or well-established businesses, the
municipality was not required to permit the use to continue.1
2
Basically the nonconforming use receives its protection from the state
and federal constitutions which prohibit the deprivation of property with-
out due process of law. In addition, some states and municipalities, ap-
parently with a desire to calm the fears of property owners,'5 have included
in their zoning legislation specific provisions forbidding the destruction of
5. See Anderson v. Jester, 206 Iowa 452, 457, 221 N.W. 354, 357 (1928).
6. Mehl v. Stegner, 38 Ohio App. 416, 175 N.E. 172 (1930).
7. Eaton v. Sweeny, 257 N.Y. 176, 177 N.E. 412 (1931). Compare Sawdey
Liquor License Case, 369 Pa. 19, 85 A.2d 28 (1951) (hotel, which was permissible
use under zoning law, could not be forbidden by zoning law to serve liquor).
8. 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930).
9. Id. at 314, 295 Pac. at 19.
10. Id. at 316, 295 Pac. at 20.
11. BAssEr, ZONING 105 (1936). See also id., at 105 n.1 (cases cited).
12. People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952).
13. See BAssEr, ZONING 113 (1936).
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nonconforming uses.' 4 In the absence of such legislation, however, it is
the state courts' interpretation of due process which forbids forced dis-
continuance; up to now there has been no United States Supreme Court
decision concerning nonconforming uses under a general zoning enact-
ment.15
Neither the due process clauses nor the legislative restrictions demand
the permissive continuance of all nonconforming uses. Eminent domain
and the law of nuisances stand as effective, but limited, tools for the elimina-
tion of undesirable uses of property. Eminent domain provides the basis
for slum clearance programs in which a municipality condemns an entire
slum or blighted area, compensates the landowners, clears the area and
constructs or authorizes the construction of housing or commercial devel-
opments. One limitation on the further exercise of this power is a con-
stitutional requirement that the purchase must be for a public use.' 6 Al-
though at least one court has found sufficient public use in preventing the
erection of a nonconforming building in a residential zone,' 7 it is extremely
doubtful that the power of eminent domain could be used to destroy many
existing nonconforming uses. Even aside from the constitutional question,
extensive use of eminent domain is prohibited by the administrative diffi-
culties involved in carrying out the necessary valuation procedures and
the high cost necessary to reimburse property owners.' 8 Yet it is impor-
tant not to overlook the possibility of utilizing this power where the
circumstances are such as to satisfy the constitutional requirements and
justify the expense.' 9
The law of nuisances is also closely related to zoning and has proved
helpful in eliminating certain uses. If a use can be declared a nuisance
it may be forced out of existence immediately. Although some courts
limit the legislature to destroying only those uses which constitute com-
14. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 40, § 26 (1952); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§55-48 (1940); PHILADELPHIA ZONING ORDINANCE § 4(1), (2), ORDINANCES OF
THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 274 (1933), as amended through 1952.
15. Cf. Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904) (amendment to an
ordinance limiting the location of gas works held an invalid exercise of the police
power as applied to a plant in the process of construction prior to the amendment).
16. Much confusion has resulted from the constitutional requirement that taking
for eminent domain be for a "public use" which narrowly defined means "use
by the public" or broadly defined means "public advantage." The opinions have
failed to indicate clearly whether the public use results from the removal of a
slum area or the construction of much needed housing. See 101 U. OF PA. L. REV.
1246 (1953).
The expenditure of public funds to control the use of property is an aspect of
Great Britain's Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEO. 6, c. 51.
See Watts, Book Review, 65 H~Auv. L. REv. 902, 904-5 (1952).
17. State ex rel. Twin City Building and Investment Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn.
1, 176 N.W. 159 (1920).
18. See BASSETr, ZONING 27 (1936).
19. In 1947 a Michigan statute authorized cities and villages to acquire "by
purchase, condemnation or otherwise private property for the removal of non-
conforming uses and structures." MIcH. STAT. ANN. c. 54 § 5.2933(1) (1949).
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mon law nuisances,20 the better authority allows the lawmakers to expand
the nuisance category.2 ' However, even the latter cases seem to be re-
stricted principally to uses causing "a tangible and material interference
with the property or personal well being of others, and likely to constitute
or become . . . common law [nuisances]." 22 Probably nuisance law
could not be brought into operation when the sole purpose of the pro-
hibition is to achieve uniformity in the neighborhood.2 Furthermore, as
will be developed later, it may be quite undesirable and, for practical pur-
poses, impossible to effect immediate destruction of all nonconforming uses.
In short, in spite of the existence of eminent domain and nuisance
law, most nonconforming uses must be dealt with under the law of zoning.
It is important to note, however, that since eminent domain and nuisance
law are available, the uses with which zoning is concerned are the less
undesirable ones.
The early history of zoning was marked not only by general acceptance
of the theory that to oust existing nonconforming uses would be unrea-
sonable because of retroactivity, but also by the absence of any counter-
balancing incentive to attack continuance of the uses. The nonconforming
use was not recognized as a potential source of great difficulty; it was
thought that nonconformers would be few in number and that time, aided
by restrictions on expansion, would repair the omissions. 24 Furthermore,
those uses that were particularly annoying would be subject to nuisance
law and possibly extinguished thereunder.n 2 5 The fact is, however, that
the nonconforming uses, often granted by law a monopolistic position in
their neighborhood, have become more firmly entrenched with the passage
of time. 6 Because of this development it may be well to reconsider the
basic doctrine of existing nonconforming uses with an eye towards either
justifying the doctrine, or limiting the incidence (and hastening the elimina-
tion) of the uses.
THE LAW OF NONCONFORMING USES
Defining the Use.-The foregoing discussion has assumed a broad
definition of the existing nonconforming use. But there are situations
where intricate problems arise as to what is or is not an existing use. If
the use involves a building, the zoning law exemption applies only while the
20. E.g., Bielecki v. Port Arthur, 12 S.W.2d 976 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929);
Manos v. Seattle, 173 Wash. 662, 667, 24 P.2d 91, 92 (1933); cases collected
in Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 COL. L. REv. 457, 461 (1941).
21. E.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
22. Noel, supra note 15, at 467.
23. Id. at 467-70. The author indicates that there are a few decisions in
which enterprises causing only intangible aesthetic annoyances have been held to
constitute common law nuisances but concludes that prevailing judicial opinion
is probably to the contrary.
24. BAssErr, ZONING 105 (1936).
25. Ibid.
26. See Note, 35 VA. L. RZv. 348, 352-3 (1949).
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building is in the same location as it was when the ordinance was passed.27
Although "existing" ordinarily means existing at the effective date of the
ordinance, 28 uses that are seasonal or have been temporarily discontinued
are not precluded. 29  A use must be what is "customarily and habitually
done" on the premises 30 and thus cannot be established by occasional acts
on the land.3 ' The mere fact that land has been platted and subdivided in
preparation for construction prior to the ordinance probably will not pre-
vent the operation of zoning restrictions on the parcels8 2 Existence of
one nonconforming use cannot be established by use for a significantly dif-
ferent nonconforming purpose; 3 for instance, permissive continuance of a
nonconforming use for the manufacture of one item does not necessarily
mean that a use may be established for the manufacture, likewise non-
conforming, of a different article.8 4 On the other hand, where an invest-
ment in buildings is at stake, a court may be unwilling to restrict a use to
the specific activity in existence at the time of the zoning enactment.8 5
Some ordinances permit a holder of a nonconforming use to change his use
to one of the same or a higher zoning classification. This encourages prop-
erty owners to change their nonconforming use as soon as it is economically
feasible to do so.88
The greatest difficulty in defining existing uses arises in determining
what acts in connection with a use must have been performed prior to
the effectiveness of the ordinance in order to establish the use. Of course,
27. Bianchi v. Commissioner of Public Bldgs., 279 Mass. 136, 181 N.E. 120
(1932) (sought to move building from one location to another).
28. See Fortunato v. Coral Gables, 47 So.2d 321, 322-3 (Fla. 1950).
29. Civic Ass'n of Dearborn v. Horowitz, 318 Mich. 333, 28 N.W.2d 97
(1947) (carnival) ; Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co., 245 Mich. 261, 222 N.W.
86 (1928) (ice house).
30. Durning v. Summerfield, 314 Ky. 318, 322, 235 S.W.2d 761, 763 (1951).
31. Ibid. (use by small carnivals for a total of 17 days in 10 years does not
establish existing use) ; Baltimore v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623, 51 A.2d 273 (1947)
(dismantling cars on several occasions does not establish a use).
32. See Bubis v. Nashville, 174 Tenn. 134, 124 S.W.2d 238 (1939). In this
type situation there was apparently no plea of nonconforming use although the
court held the facts sufficient to support the grant of a variance.
33. E.g., Snow v. Johnston, 197 Ga. 146, 28 S.E.2d 270 (1943) (could not
change from armory to funeral home); City of Lynn v. Deam, 324 Mass. 607,
87 N.E.2d 849 (1949) (can't change from dance ball to restaurant); Crompton &
Co. v. Sea Girt, 1 N.J. Super. 607, 63 A.2d 834 (1949) (storage of boats and
autos does not establish use for storage of food) ; Kensington Realty Holding Co.
v. Jersey City, 118 NJ.L. 114, 191 Atl. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd, 119 NJ.L.
338, 196 Atl. 691 (1938) (use for doctor's office and for tea room could not establish
use for funeral parlor).
34. See Application of Braunsdorf, 111 N.Y.S.2d 507, 511 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (at-
tempt to change from manufacture of organ supplies to manufacture of syrup).
35. See Botz v. Garrett, 236 Mo. App. 566, 159 S.W.2d 367 (1942).
36. The Philadelphia zoning ordinance says that a "use shall not be changed
to a use designated for a district having less restictive regulations." PHILADELPHIA
ZONING ORDINANCE § 4(3). ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 274 (1933),
as amended through 1952. The implication is that it may be changed to a use of a
higher classification.
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fruitless efforts to obtain a permit are not sufficient3 7 But where the
owner has obtained a valid permit and has either done substantial con-
structing or incurred substantial liabilities, the general rule is that a
"vested right" to such use is established.V 8 A minority of cases, relying
on the alleged prospective nature of zoning, have indicated that mere
issuance of a valid permit without construction creates an existing use.39
Under the prevailing view, acts insignificant in themselves 40 or those
trifling in respect to the final cost 4' are not sufficient to raise a use.
A peculiar problem in defining an existing use arises when sufficient
construction to establish a use has taken place while a zoning ordinance
is under consideration, and the use by virtue of this ordinance becomes
nonconforming. Some cases say that here a property owner acts at his
peril and cannot qualify for an exemption,4 although at least one decision
has been to the contrary.4 In this situation many factors probably enter
into the final determination. Did the individual act in good faith, or was
he merely trying to "beat" the ordinance? Did the municipality delay
an unusually long time 44 and thus present the builder with the choice
of either postponing construction indefinitely or "taking a chance" with
the zoning ordinance? Was the fact that zoning was under consideration
37. Taub v. McElligott, 246 App. Div. 729, 283 N.Y. Supp. 665 (2d Dep't 1935);
Gheen v. Mencer, 52 Pa. D. & C. 422 (1945).
38. Pelham View Apts. v. Switzer, 130 Misc. 545, 224 N.Y. Supp. 56 (Sup. Ct.
1927) (paid for architect's services and excavation; court also emphasizes payment
of purchase price in reliance on right to build). Wickstrom v. City of Laramie, 37
Wyo. 389, 262 Pac. 22 (1927) (garage half built before permit revoked). Compare
New Britain v. Kilbourne, 109 Conn. 422, 147 Atl. 124 (1929) where ordinance al-
lowed completion of structures if construction were begun within 90 days. Defend-
ant started grading, filling ravine and building a culvert. The court held that this
was sufficient and added that the exception to the ordinance "fairly seeks to avoid
the unjust imposition of loss upon those who bave in good faith and in reliance
upon the act of the city thus invested their money and labor in building operations."
Id. at 427, 147 Atl. at 125.
39. London v. Robinson, 94 Cal. App. 774, 271 Pac. 921 (1928) (court said that
a section of the ordinance clearly exempted cases where permits already issued, but
also indicated that their rule of construction was that the ordinance will not revoke
permits unless it specifically so states). Compare Brown v. Grant, 2 S.W.2d 285,
287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (buildings were "wellnigh completed" before ordinance
took effect, although the court indicated that a permit is a contract which cannot be
breached).
40. McCurley v. El Reno, 138 Okla. 92, 280 Pac. 467 (1929) (four or five men
did a half day's work on the foundation which was not enough). But cf. In re
Appeal of Supply Co., 202 N.C. 496, 163 S.E. 462 (1932) (placing building ma-
terials on premises with intent to build is sufficient).
41. Brady v. Keene, 90 N.H. 99, 4 A.2d 685 (1939) (entering into leasing agree-
ment and cutting some shrubbery not enough).
42. Colby v. Board of Adjus't, 81 Colo. 344, 255 Pac. 443 (1927) (knew of
impending ordinance) ; Dallas v. Meserole, 155 S.W.2d 1019 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
(what construction was done appears to have been minor).
43. Clinton v. Ross, 226 N.C. 682, 40 S.E.2d 593 (1946) (construction between
adoption and effective date of ordinance).
44. See Mongiello Bros., Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 10 N.J. Misc. 131, 158
Atl. 325 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (court ordered issue of permit because of the delay);
Deerfield Realty Co. v. Hague, 6 N.J. Misc. 637, 151 Atl. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1930);
Atlas v. Dick, 192 Misc. 843, 81 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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given public notice? Possibly the problem can be alleviated by a publicized
legislative resolution to the effect that a zoning ordinance is under con-
sideration.45
When the existing use was undertaken in violation of a law, another
difficult problem may be presented. If, when the use was instituted, the
owner knowingly violated the zoning or some other law, the courts have
no difficulty in requiring discontinuance of the use.46 This result seems
justified, since one who intentionally violates the law should not be able
thereby to defeat the purposes of zoning. When, however, the unlawful
construction results from an error by the building inspector rather than
being an intentional violation by the owner, a decision is more difficult.
One answer is to say that a valid permit, once issued by an authorized
agent acting within his authority, confers the right to a use if acted upon.
47
The opposite result is occasionally reached on the theory that the city is
not estopped from enforcing its zoning because of acts of its officials. 48
It is difficult to see how property owners in these cases are in a position
any different from that of the owner of a use which existed prior to the
zoning restriction.
Ordinarily in defining a nonconforming use, no distinction is made as
to whether or not the land has been improved. It has been held that the
storage of lumber on land by a lumber company constituted a use within
the nonconforming provision.49  The result has been the same when the
land is used annually for a carnival. 0 In the latter case, the court main-
tained that the nonconforming use section of the law was directed at the
use of land and not the occupancy of it.
Extension of Use and Alteration of Facilities.-A necessary corollary
to the definition and description of the nonconforming use is the question
of the extent of the rights obtained once the use itself is established. From
early in the history of zoning it has been recognized that a legitimate
method whereby the nonconforming use can be eliminated is to limit its
45. In McCurley v. El Reno, 138 Okla. 92, 280 Pac. 467 (1929) the court en-
forced a temporary zoning ordinance which for one year prevented, inter alia, con-
struction of business buildings in areas designated residential. The ordinance was
held not subject to the statutorily prescribed procedure for zoning enactments. For
a similar holding see Lima v. Woodruff, 107 Cal. App. 285, 290 Pac. 480 (1930).
46. Wilkins v. San Bernardino, 162 P.2d 711 (Cal. 1945); aff'd, 29 Cal. 2d 332,
175 P.2d 542 (1946) (zoning law); Larson v. Howland, 108 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup.
Ct. 1951) (restrictive covenant) ; Heimerle v. Bronxville, 168 Misc. 783, 5
N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (no permit); Town of Ramapo v. Bockar, 151
Misc. 613, 273 N.Y. Supp. 452 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (conservation law) ; Kane v. Lapre,
69 R.I. 330, 33 A.2d 218 (1943) (had knowingly violated statute ten years before
any action was taken); Scott v. Champion Bldg. Co., 28 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1930) (zoning law).
47. Village of Attica v. Day, 134 Misc. 882, 236 N.Y. Supp. 607 (Sup. Ct. 1929),
aff'd, 230 App. Div. 776, 243 N.Y. Supp. 915 (4th Dep't 1930).
48. Corpus Christi v. Jones, 144 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
49. Durkin Lumber Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 106 N.J.L. 183, 147 Atl. 555 (1929).
50. Civic Ass'n of Dearborn v. Horowitz, 318 Mich. 333, 28 N.W.2d 97 (1947).
1953]
98 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102
expansion and alteration of its facilities.Y5 Consequently, some ordinances
state that a nonconforming use may not be extended or the premises al-
tered,52 or that its extension is limited to a certain fixed percentage of
area.53 Two theories have developed as to what limitations may be cast
about the extension of the existing use. The first is that the use once
instituted may be restricted to the boundaries of the original lot, but
within this sphere must be allowed to increase by natural expansion. "4
The narrower theory is that the use as of the date of zoning enactment
describes the exact limits.55 The influence of this latter theory is manifest
in the general rules, sometimes legislatively imposed, that existing non-
conforming uses may not be extended by new buildings,5 6 by additions
to existing buildings,57 by reconstruction or replacement of old buildings,
5 8
or by changing the use.59 On the other hand, Pennsylvania has allowed
the construction of a concrete warehouse for the storage of lumber which
had formerly been kept in the open, on the theory that such additions,
made to provide for natural expansion and increased trade, cannot be
prevented unless detrimental to the health, welfare, and morals of the com-
51. See Note, 35 VA. L. REv. 348, 353 n.35 (1949). Bassett says: "A non-
conforming building cannot be enlarged as a matter of right" BAssET, ZONING
109 (1936).
52. E.g., Dayton, Ohio Zoning Ordinance § 210 cited in Note, 35 VA. L. REv.
348, 349 (1949).
53. The Philadelphia zoning ordinance limits extension of a nonconforming
use in a building to 25% of the area of the building at the time of the ordinance.
PHILADELPHIA ZONING ORDINANCE §4(6), ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF PHILADEL-
PHIA 275 (1933), as amended through 1952.
54. E.g., In re Gilfillan's Permit, 291 Pa. 358, 140 Atl. 136 (1927).
55. E.g., Billerica v. Quinn, 320 Mass. 687, 71 N.E.2d 235 (1947) (stripping
the top soil) ; People v. Gerus, 69 N.Y.S.2d 283 (County Ct. 1942) (sand pit).
56. Yuba City v. Cherniavsky, 117 Cal. App. 568, 4 P.2d 299 (1931) ; Connors
v. Burlington, 325 Mass. 494, 91 N.E.2d 212 (1950) ; Inspector of Bldgs. v. Murphy,
320 Mass. 207, 68 N.E.2d 918 (1946); Hyams v. Amchir, 57 N.Y.S.2d 77 (Sup. Ct.
1945).
57. Rehfeld v. San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83, 21 P.2d 419 (1933); Knox v.
Baltimore, 180 Md. 88, 23 A.2d 15 (1941) ; Green v. Board of Comm'rs, 131 N.J.L.
336, 36 A.2d 610 (1944); Meixner v. Board of Adjus't, 131 N.J.L. 599, 37 A.2d
678 (1944); Burmore Co. v. Smith, 124 N.J.L. 541, 12 A.2d 353 (1940); Taft v.
Zoning Bd. of Review, 75 R.I. 117, 64 A.2d 200 (1949).
58. Thayer v. Board of App., 114 Conn. 15, 157 Atl. 273 (1931); Price v.
Ackman, 345 Ill. App. 1, 102 N.E.2d 194 (1951); Colati v. Jirout, 186 Md. 652,
47 A.2d 613 (1946); Sitgreaves v. Board of Adjus't, 136 N.J.L. 21, 54 A.2d 451
(Sup. Ct. 1947); Cole v. Battle Creek, 298 Mich. 98, 298 N.W. 466 (1941);
DeVito v. Pearsall, 115 N.J.L. 323, 180 Atl. 202 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
59. Moore v. Lexington, 309 Ky. 671, 218 S.W.2d 7 (1948) (ordinance which
prevented plaintiff from converting garage apartment for servants into efficiency
apartment for renting, upheld); Lexington v. Bean, 272 Mass. 547, 172 N.E. 867
(1930) (change from repair shop for owner's fleet of trucks to a commercial repair
shop is substantially different and not allowed under the ordinance) ; People v.
Giorgi, 16 N.Y.S.2d 923 (County Ct. 1939) (from use incident to general contracting
to manufacture of cement blocks not allowed) ; Shields v. Spokane School Dist.,
31 Wash. 2d 247, 196 P.2d 352 (1948) (from elementary school to trade school).
NONCONFORMING USES
munity. ° Similarly, in a case arising under a New York City ordinance
the cementing of an entire lot and the installation of storage tanks and
pumps for a gas station, where previously a stable had stood, were per-
mitted because the ordinance restricted the alteration of buildings but not
of premises."1 These latter decisions illustrate the results which can stem
from the application of a philosophy of natural expansion.
The application of the theories is clearer when the attempted change
involves internal modifications or deletions from the buildings or an in-
crease in area or volume of the use. Apparently under either the strict
limitation or the natural expansion doctrine, insubstantial renovations or
extensions are permissible,6 although even here strict limitations as to
cubic footage have sometimes been imposed.P When the existing use
involves unimproved land, such as is the case with extraction, under the
natural expansion theory the whole lot is considered to be in use from the
beginning and operations may be extended accordingly. 4 The strict limi-
tation concept goes to the other extreme, saying that a use must be limited
to the extent of use at the time of ordinance adoption or it cannot be
preserved.65 An attempt by the nonconforming user to increase the volume
of his business over that existing at the date of ordinance is usually con-
doned on the theory that an increase in magnitude, no matter how great,
is not a prohibited extension. 0 In one case a court recognized that a
60. In re Gilfillan's Permit, 291 Pa. 358, 140 Atl. 136 (1927). See also
Humphreys v. Stuart Realty Corp., 364 Pa. 616, 73 A.2d 407 (1950) (storage
capacity for gasoline increased from 100,000 gallons to 224,000 gallons by addition of
new storage tanks); Kellman v. McShain, 369 Pa. 14, 85 A.2d 32 (1951) (could
replace by a solid roof a roof which had had a ten foot square opening and which
had been destroyed by fire).
61. 440 E. 1022 St. Corp. v. Murdock, 285 N.Y. 298, 34 N.E.2d 329 (1941).
62. Paul v. Scituate, 301 Mass. 365, 17 N.E.2d 193 (1938) (construction of
additional room on restaurant) ; Page v. Grosse Point, 279 Mich. 254, 271 N.W. 826
(1937) (installation of new front on store) ; Lane v. Bigelow, 135 N.J.L. 195, 50 A.2d
638 (1947) (removal of 35 feet of fronting of building to change auto service station
into modern drive-in service station) ; Davis Appeal, 367 Pa. 340, 80 A.2d 789 (1951)
(internal alterations to increase number of apartments from three to four).
63. State ex rel. Hochfelder v. New Orleans, 171 La. 1053, 132 So. 786 (1931)
(ordinance which was interpreted to prevent any increase in square footage or cubical
contents enforced so as to prevent any increase in store space by removal of parti-
tion). But cf. People ex rel. Wohl v. Leo, 109 Misc. 448, 178 N.Y. Supp. 851
(Sup. Ct. 1919) (whole building may be used for purpose for which it was designed
although only half was so used at the time the ordinance was passed).
64. Lamb v. A. D. McKee, Inc., 10 N.J. Misc. 649, 160 Atl. 563 (Sup. Ct. 1935);
Cheswick Borough v. Bechman, 352 Pa. 79, 42 A.2d 60 (1945).
65. Edmonds v. Board of Sup'rs, 236 P.2d 646 (Cal. 1951) (number of trailers
in trailer camp) ; Billerica v. Quinn, 320 Mass. 687, 71 N.E.2d 235 (1947) (stripping
of top soil) ; People v. Gerus, 69 N.Y.S.2d 283 (County Ct. 1942) (sand pit).
66. Green v. Garrett, 192 Md. 52, 63 A.2d 326 (1949) (from use for professional
football and one professional baseball game to use for professional baseball for a
considerable part of the year at night as well as during the day) ; Cochran v. Roemer,
287 Mass. 500, 192 N.E. 58 (1934) (from small retail coal and coke business using
two or three trucks to a wholesale fuel business with many new structures and as
many as 28 trucks. Ordinance allowed enlargement and alteration so long as not
detrimental to the community); People v. Perkins, 282 N.Y. 329, 26 N.E.2d 278
(1940) (increase in volume of. flower, vegetable and fruit business with more ex-
tensive use of lot). Cf. Marcus v. Marmaroneck, 283 N.Y. 325, 28 N.E.2d 856
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business may increase and the manner of operation change so much that
in effect the nature of the use is changed.
67
Discontinuance.-A common method for extinguishing a nonconform-
ing use is to require by ordinance that if the use is discontinued, it may
not thereafter be resumed.68 The rationale behind this rule is that the
once great burden of conformance is no longer present when the owner,
by his own initiative, has ceased to exploit the use. 9 Although probably
all would agree that the use is terminated if the building constituting the
use collapses from age,7" courts in applying the provision in any situation
short of this have made it difficult to show discontinuance. The doctrine
is that discontinuance equals abandonment and abandonment requires a
voluntary, completed, affirmative act on the part of the owner.71 It requires
the concurrence of an intent to abandon and some overt act or failure to
act which implies abandonment.72 The elusive nature of this doctrine pre-
cludes any absolute statement as to what will or will not amount to aban-
donment. Since intent is considered important, probably the mere passage
of time will not amount to abandonment, but as the period of nonuse grows
it may become easier to demonstrate the intent to abandon. One factor
given weight in determining the intent is whether the building continues
to be adaptable for the use.73 The intent necessary to indicate abandon-
(1940), reversing, 258 App. Div. 328, 16 N.Y.S.2d 626 (2d Dep't 1940) (Lower
court permitted large increase in dining and refreshment facilities at beach club.
Court of appeals reversed on the ground that the cost of alterations was beyond
limit set by ordinance). In Firth v. Scherzberg, 366 Pa. 443, 77 A.2d 443 (1951),
the use had increased to such a magnitude as to be enjoinable as a nuisance at
night, but still was allowed to continue as a nonconforming use in the day-time.
67. Marblehead v. Rosenthal, 316 Mass. 124, 55 N.E.2d 13 (1944) (from dry
cleaning establishment, where most work sent out, to "industrial establishment,"
where most work done on the premises).
68. "No building or premises where a nonconforming use is discontinued for
more than two years . . . shall again be devoted to any use that is prohibited in
such district." Dayton, Ohio, Zoning Ordinance §210 cited in 35 VA. L. REv.
348, 349 (1949). The ordinance may also take the form that once the use is changed
to one of a higher classification or to a conforming use it may not thereafter be
changed to a use of a lower classification. See ordinance cited in Collingsdale v.
Mager, 32 Del. County 305 (Pa. 1944).
69. "The accepted method of accomplishing the ultimate object [of zoning] is
that, while the alien use is permitted to continue until some change is made or
contemplated, thereupon, so far as is expedient, advantage is taken of this fact to
compel a lessening or suppression of the nonconformity." Darien v. Webb, 115
Conn. 581, 585, 162 AtI. 690, 692 (1932).
70. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Downing, 224 Ind. 457, 68 N.E.2d 789 (1946).
71. Binghamton v. Gartell, 275 App. Div. 457, 90 N.Y.S.2d 556 (3d Dep't
1949) ; State ex rel. Shaetz v. Manders, 206 Wis. 121, 238 N.W. 835 (1931).
72. Wood v. District of Columbia, 39 A.2d 67 (D.C. Mun. App. 1944) ; Douglas
v. Melrose Park, 389 Ill. 98, 58 N.E.2d 864 (1945); People ex rel. Delgado v.
Morris, 334 Ill. App. 557, 79 N.E.2d 839 (1948); Highland Park v. Marshall, 235
S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). See also Longo v. Eilers, 196 Misc. 909, 93
N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1949) where dilapidated condition of grandstand, failure
to pay taxes and six year vacancy were held to show voluntary relinquishment
of a known right.
73. See Haller Baking Co.'s App., 295 Pa. 257, i45 Atl. 77 (1928) ; Marshak v.
Long Beach, 81 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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ment is most readily shown by a conversion to another use,74 but lesser
acts may sometimes be sufficient.
75
An interesting problem arises when the use has ceased as the result
of some force beyond the control of the owner, such as depression, war,
or fire, and other "natural" causes. Since the general doctrine requires
that the abandonment be voluntary, the common result in these cases is that
the owner may continue his nonconforming use whether it requires recon-
struction 70 or not.7 7 But here, too, he may possibly lose his right if there
is evidence of an intent to abandon 7 8 or, if the ordinance so provides, he
fails to rebuild a destroyed building within a specified time.
79
Anortization.-A refinement of discontinuance as a method of de-
stroying nonconforming uses is amortization, whereby within a specified
time nonconforming uses must be discontinued. The theory seems to be
that it is not unreasonable to require the nonconforming user to cease
operations at the end of the time since during the period of grace he has
a monopolistic position which, if properly exploited, sufficiently compen-
sates him for the eventual property deprivation.80 Although amortization
appears to be a highly desirable method of eliminating the uses, the number
of cases on the subject indicates that it has been used infrequently. Twenty-
four years ago the Louisiana court, using a theory of nuisance law, sus-
tained an ordinance with a one year amortization provision.81 More re-
cently a Tallahassee ordinance, which required the removal from a resi-
dential district within a period of ten years of all automobile service sta-
74. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Sprague, 4 F. Supp. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); Branch
v. Powers, 210 Ark. 836, 197 S.W.2d 928 (1946) ; In re Auditorium Inc., 84 A.2d
598 (Del. Super. 1951) ; Montclair v. Bryan, 16 N.J. Super. 535, 85 A.2d 231 (1951) ;
Berdan v. Patterson, 137 N.J.L. 286, 62 A.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Chipolone v.
Clifton, 137 N.J.L. 307, 59 A.2d 815 (Sup. Ct 1948). Minor changes in use will
be all right. See Ewing v. Braun, 196 So. 571 (La. 1940).
75. See Francisco v. Colombus, 31 N.E.2d 236 (Ohio 1937) (acts outweighed
alleged intent when owner built new plant and removed most machinery from old) ;
State v. Casper, 5 N.J. Super. 150, 68 A.2d 545 (1949) (ejecting roomers and
renting for a private home).
76. Brous v. Hempstead, 272 App. Div. 31, 69 N.Y.S.2d 258 (2d Dep't 1947)
(complete destruction by hurricane); Navin v. Early, 56 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct.
1945) (destruction by fire less than 75% under an ordinance which said that recon-
struction permit may be issued if less than 75% loss).
77. Haulenbeek v. Allenhurst, 136 N.J.L. 557, 57 A.2d 52 (1947) (depression
then use by the army); People v. Emigrant Industrial Say. Bank, 261 App. Div.
402, 25 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1st Dep't 1941) (could continue as nonconforming parking lot
where destroyed building was a nonconforming garage); State ex rel. Morehouse
v. Hunt, 235 Wis. 358, 291 N.W. 745 (1940) (fraternity house leased as private
home during depression).
78. Curtis-Wright Export v. Garden City, 185 Misc. 508, 57 N.Y.S.2d 377
(Sup. Ct. 1945) (retention of some employees and records at the plant and use
of part of the plant to produce income negated intent to abandon although most of
plant had been shut down for eight years and most machinery removed).
79. E.g., Palazzola v. Gulfport, 211 Miss. 737, 52 So.2d 611 (1951).
80 See Note, 9 U. OF CmI. L. REv. 477, 485-6 (1942).
81. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613
(1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929). See also State ex rel. Dema Realty Co.
v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929).
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tions, was held by the Fifth Circuit to be a reasonable exercise of the police
power.8 These appear to be the only cases; but, since several large cities
have recently adopted amortization provisions,83 the popularity of this
method for eliminating nonconforming uses may be on the increase. An
impediment in some states will be the enabling statutes which specifically
protect nonconforming uses. Since amortization operates to destroy these
uses, prior repeal of the protective provisions is probably necessary.
RATIONALE OF THE DOCTRINE
The basic doctrine in the law of nonconforming uses is that zoning,
as distinguished from nuisance law, cannot operate retroactively. Judicial
opinions sanction this doctrine by pointing out that the destruction of
existing uses places such a great burden on a few individuals that it is
not justified in the absence of absolute public necessity. Seldom do the
courts go further in explaining why uses are or should be protected.
Zoning as it affects every piece of property is to some extent retro-
active in that it applies to land already owned at the time of the ordinance
and the effect of zoning restrictions may be to depreciate sharply the value
of a particular plot of land.8 4 An unusual example of this may be seen
in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,8 5 the leading case upholding zoning as
a legitimate exercise of the non-compensating police power. Here the
Supreme Court of the United States sustained zoning restrictions on vacant
land directly in the path of Cleveland's industrial development with the
effect that value was reduced from $10,000 to $2,500 per acre.86 Although
in the ordinary situation the effect is not nearly so drastic, the case serves
to highlight the possibility of loss when the use of land is restricted.
Furthermore, the cases which require substantial construction before a
use in a structure may be established do not always operate to prevent
economic loss. The rule may put to naught substantial expenses merely
because they were incurred in preparation and investigation rather than
in construction.
s7
From a comparison of Jones v. City of Los Angeles 8 8 and Euclid,
and with a view of the substantial construction doctrine in action, one can
82. Standard Oil Co. v. Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950).
83. See [1951] Wis. L. REV. 685, 691.
84. Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 COL. L. Rxv. 457, 458 (1941).
Note that an important constituent of market value of land is the land's potential
uses.
85. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
86. Id. at 384.
87. County Comm'rs v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 46 A.2d 684 (1946) (several
thousand dollars spent grading and landscaping). Cf. West Bros. Brick Co. v.
Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937) (clay company paid premium on basis
of known clay deposits and then was prevented from extracting the clay). Contra:
Rosenberg v. Whitefish Bay, 199 Wis. 214, 225 N.W. 838 (1929) (erection of non-
conforming building permitted where obligations incurred for architect's services
and travel expenses totaled about $9000).
88. See note 8 supra.
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see that the economic hardship inherent in retroactivity cannot be relied
on as the sole reason for protecting existing nonconforming uses. Other
grounds must be put forth to explain why courts have been unanimous
in condemning the Jones situation (existing use) and sustaining the Euclid
case (potential use).
Effect on Present Owner.-First it must be recognized that zoning is
a collection of restrictions and every restriction means a possible loss to
someone; it is only in the exceptional case where the loss is especially great
that protection should be afforded.8 9 The easiest and most workable place
to draw a line is at the existing use, especially if the use embodies sub-
stantial improvement on the land. An obvious difficulty here, however, is
that convenience of administration, in itself, is a weak basis for a rule.
A second reason for drawing the existing-potential dichotomy con-
cerns, in particular, going businesses. Since there are few if any zones
from which private residences are prohibited, probably the bulk of non-
conforming use cases concern business properties. The enforced removal
or discontinuance of these uses will involve an interruption or cessation
of business with the resultant loss of good will and trade. It is not a
sufficient answer to this problem to say that the individual need merely
relocate and resume operations, for, especially in older municipalities, space
may not be available, and in addition, location is an important factor in
good will.
Effect on economic investment.-Any adverse effect on the present
owner of land will, of course, discourage future investment. This is an-
other way of explaining the protection given existing uses. The law of
zoning should be designed to protect the reasonable expectations of per-
sons who plan to enter business or make improvements on property. The
possibility that the municipality could by zoning force removal of instal-
lations or cessation of business might serve to deter such investors. The
danger of deterring investment was particularly great when zoning in its
early history was experiencing a sharp rise in popularity, with urban in-
vestors anxiously watching its approach to their community. The problem
must still be faced today in communities which do not yet have a compre-
hensive zoning enactment. Furthermore, even in municipalities where
zoning is established, there is always the possibility that the city will change
the zoning classification. Reclassification is most likely to occur, if at all,
along the dividing lines between zones and in zones which are in a state
of transition.
The existing-potential line, then, serves to assure individual land-
owners that the material investments which they make will not be dissolved
by the government without compensation unless the use constitutes a
nuisance. Furthermore, the general requirements of zoning which demand
89. See text at and preceding note 12 supra.
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that in classifying an area the city consider the present nature of that area
give added assurance to improvers of land.90
To state the reasonable expectations rationale differently, the protec-
tion of existing uses protects the increase in value of property caused by
owner-made improvements and does not protect the value increment
caused by forces beyond the control and efforts of any particular holder
of property. Thus owners who make use of, or improve, land are pro-
tected while the holder of unused land is not. A number of considerations
serve to justify this distinction. Effective zoning requires a policy of
enforcing restrictions as fully as possible. Since much unused land is held
merely as a speculative venture, to deny special protection to the owners
of such land would not necessarily frustrate their primary purpose, i.e.,
to sell the land at a higher price; in fact, future zoning restrictions may
be a factor upon which they are speculating. In addition, the dominant
public policy of encouraging the use of land helps to explain the preference
given to one who develops realty, as opposed to one whose land is making
no contribution to the public wealth. This may be the explanation of the
Supreme Court's refusal to condemn the extraordinary effect of the ordi-
nance in the Euclid case.
Prevention of Economic Waste.-The foregoing reasons justify the
accepted distinction because it allows zoning to operate with relative free-
dom and still affords protection to individuals in their capacity as private
owners or potential investors in land improvements and business. But
another possible approach is to consider society's interest in the existing
nonconforming use, i.e., that forced destruction will often result in economic
waste. Although this reason justifies the legislative judgment that exist-
ing uses should be protected, it should also aid courts in interpreting and
applying the legislative rule. Avoidance of economic waste supplies, in
addition, an argument against indiscriminate use of the power of eminent
domain. In the case of highly specialized buildings the public benefit of
discontinuing their use by eminent domain would be trifling compared to
the resultant waste. Even where the improvements are not so specialized
and could be readily converted to a conforming use, the reconstruction
necessary to relocate the activity may be quite wasteful. A further aspect
of economic waste concerns extraction operations, such as mining and
quarrying, which must be confined to the places where the materials can
be found. Here, especially if the commodity is essential, there may be good
reason to allow continuance, to liberalize the rules against expansion and
even to permit operation of quarries not yet opened in order to utilize the
minerals.9 1
90. See text at notes 3, 4, 6, 7 supra.
91. The Philadelphia zoning ordinance allows the Zoning Board of Adjustment
to permit opening and/or operating of quarries in any district. PHILADELPHIA
ZONING ORDINANCE § 26(9), ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 335 (1933),
as amended through 1952. Compare West Bros. Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va.
271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937), where clay company which had paid a premium for land
with known clay deposits was denied under ordinance passed subsequent to purchase
of land, right to extract clay.
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CRITICISM OF PRESENT LAW
Consideration of both the objectives of zoning and the submitted
reasons for protecting existing uses poses the problem as one of developing
or preserving an ideally planned community by preventing or eliminating
undesired uses in certain areas without (1) imposing undue hardship on
individuals; (2) unreasonably deterring investment in business, or in land
improvements; (3) or causing unnecessary economic waste. There re-
mains the task of analyzing present law in terms of this basic conflict.
Defining the Nonconforming Use.-The common prerequisite for
protection as a nonconforming use is that the use be a going activity; where
this requirement is met, a balancing of the public interest against the private
interest leads to the conclusion that usually protection is justifiable. Where
the activity involves the use of land improvements, discontinuance will
ordinarily result in economic waste as well as severe personal loss with
the concurrent deterrence of economic investment. This result, of course,
follows only if the improvements involved are not readily convertible to a
conforming use. With uses operated on substantially unimproved land,
such as parking lots and open storage, the balance is more favorable to the
public interest than it is where there are improvements. Here any invest-
ment which the owner has is, in all likelihood, considerably less than that
of owners with improvements. Furthermore, there is little chance of
economic waste on unimproved land. But good will of a going business
does attach to a location and the reasonable expectations of users of this
land deserve to be considered. An intelligent approach to the definition of
the nonconforming use requires that the legislature in the first instance,
supplemented by the courts where necessary, consider all such factors in
an attempt to balance the basic conflict of interests.
A rule which requires substantial construction before an existing use
will be declared also seems, in the light of a weighing of interests, to be
justified in most cases. There is no interference with a going busi-
ness or good will accompanying removal of even substantial construction;
however, removal of even insubstantial construction will result in some
hardship to the individual and some economic waste. Furthermore,
an owner who plans to build may reasonably expect that once construc-
tion has started he will be able to complete the improvement and operate
it. Yet, in comparison with the results in forcing removal of substantial
construction, to destroy insubstantial construction creates relatively little
economic waste, personal hardship, and deterrence to investment.
The three objections to destroying nonconforming uses again have
relevance in determining how broad the exemption for nonconforming
property should be. When an owner desires to change his use it is often
because of the compulsion of economic conditions. The factors of going
business and good will are, at the time, substantially minimized. But,
since the salvage value of improvements will be eliminated in such a case
if the owner is required either to continue or to conform, economic hard-
ship and economic waste may occur. Thus, a limitation which permits
19531
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minor changes in the nature of the use seems to be the one most in accord
with a balancing of interests. However, since few if any of these objec-
tions apply to uses on unimproved land, there may be no impediments
to the prohibition of any change of use in that situation.
Unless the owner has acted knowingly or unreasonably, there is no
justification for refusing to apply the foregoing analysis to nonconform-
ing uses which come into existence through violations of law. Although
the law breacher can hardly be said to have "rightfully" initiated his
use, the objections of interference with business and production of eco-
nomic waste apply also to his case. These factors, in addition to the
owner's innocence and the probable infrequency with which the problem
will arise, militate against a declaration that the public interest in zoning
outweighs the importance of continuing the use.
Extension and Alterations.-To analyze the doctrine of extension one
must return again to the basic conflict in zoning which makes necessary
the nonconforming use. Certain owners are given an exemption from
conformance in order to protect present investment, to encourage future
investment and to prevent economic waste. At this point they are in no
worse position than the vacant landowner, who receives no exemption,
because any possibility of increase in value is speculative in nature. In
addition, if the owners are businessmen, they are given the advantage
of a monopolistic position in the area. If conversion to a conforming
use can be encouraged without interfering with the original reasons for
allowing the use, the ultimate goal of zoning can be attained. At the
outset, strict limitations on expansion appear to accomplish this result
since the owner is given the present use of the premises with the right
to exploit a monopoly, but is forced to relocate when his needs increase.
The difficulties, however, are that one of the reasonable expectations of
a person entering business is that he will be able to expand when neces-
sary, and, also, that economic use of one's existing installations may
require occasional expansion. These problems are especially evident where
the use is an extraction operation, for here the exercise of the use is
impractical without the right to expand. In short, a bard and fast rule is
undesirable; a strict limitation rule with provision for the granting of
an exception by the zoning board in the necessary cases may be the most
reasonable solution.
Discontinuance.-In the doctrine of discontinuance is found the
strongest evidence of a desire on the part of courts to protect the non-
conforming user. Protection is accomplished mainly by equating dis-
continuance with abandonment and then applying the narrow rules for
abandonment of real property to the rights of a nonconforming user. This
analysis omits consideration of the fact that the community interest in
eventual dissolution of nonconforming uses is greater than the community
interest in the abandonment of real property. Recognition of an intent
to continue as a force sufficient to preserve a nonconforming use 92 may
92. See text at note 72 supra.
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often be unnecessary to avoid either personal loss or deterrence of in-
vestment activity. Adequate protection appears to inhere in recent de-
cisions which have recognized that a city may by ordinance make mere
non-use for a certain period of time sufficient to extinguish the right so
long as the stipulated time is reasonable. 93 Economic waste, although
less of a factor when the use has been discontinued, militates against such
a result, because of the unreasonableness of requiring the destruction of
some specialized buildings that still have use value. Where a building
has been destroyed by an act of God, no economic waste and little loss
to the individual would follow from forbidding reconstruction; public
interest in enforcing zoning would ordinarily outweigh the loss of good
will from forcing the owner to rebuild elsewhere.
Amortization.-Although, prima facie, amortization appears to satisfy
most of the objections to destroying nonconforming uses, there is the
difficulty that unless the time period is varied for each type of installation
there is a high possibility of economic waste when specialized properties
are involved. Otherwise amortization seems to give effect to interests
of the community without running afoul of the principal reasons for allow-
ing nonconforming uses to exist and continue.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate object of zoning is the development of a planned com-
munity which theoretically will benefit the public as a whole. As has
been demonstrated, however, this object cannot and should not be achieved
indiscriminately at the expense of the owner of the nonconforming use.
The purpose of this Note has been to describe present zoning law, to
attempt a logical rationalization for the protection of nonconforming uses
and to develop an approach whereby the determination of future cases
may be facilitated. Prevention of personal loss, encouragement of future
investment, and prevention of economic waste are all factors to be con-
sidered in opposition to the desire for a planned community. The defini-
tion of the existing use should be in terms of a resolution of this conflict
rather than an attempt to discover what is a use and whether or not it
exists. When the question shifts to one of extension or discontinuance the
inquiry should be the same. Always it should be remembered that zoning
law is necessary to dissolve an undesirable use only because the use was
not sufficiently noxious to be controllable under nuisance law or to
command the city to expend funds under the power of eminent domain.
This being the case, the need for a destructive element in zoning is con-
siderably lessened. Yet, since the existence of nonconforming uses is
inconsistent with the ultimate goal of zoning, there should be no hesita-
tion in destroying these developmental inconsistencies as soon as the rea-
sons for their protection have ceased to exist.
93. Berkman v. Board of App., 135 Conn. 393, 64 A.2d 875 (1949) (ordinance
applied to sale of liquor); Franmore Realty Corp. v. LeBourf, 201 Misc. 220, 104
N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
